Abstract--This paper examines some aspects of the reliability of several forms of local-area network. An approach derived from graph theory is used to analyse the reliability of a network from link failure, and this method is applied for illustration to four typical network topologies. For a more complete analysis incorporating both link and station failure, a failure-rate model approach is used and is applied in particular to a study of the Ethernet and Cambridge digital ring forms of network.
INTRODUCTION
The reliability of a network is a function of its topology and the probability of failure of its station and links [1] . Four common network topologies, which will be briefly discussed in the next section, are the hierarchical, star, bus and loop or ring topologies. Local-area networks of these forms, and particularly bus and ring networks, are becoming increasingly widely used see Refs [2, 3] and this has given rise to considerable interest in the study of their reliability. An exact calculation of the reliability of the communication links between any pair of stations in a distributed computer network, has not, in general, been feasible for large networks, and those calculations which exist tend to be specific to a particular aspect of the reliability analysis of the network. Hence, many suggestions have been made for analysis based on approximate calculations; for a detailed investigation of these suggestions, see the survey paper by Wilkov [4] .
In this paper we first perform a preliminary analysis of the reliability due to link failure of each of the four network topologies under consideration. This is followed by a more complete analysis in which station failure is also considered, using a failure-rate model approach. In this latter analysis we will consider in particular, two widely used types of local-area network: the Ethernet, which is a branching broadcast (bus) system [5] ; and the Cambridge digital communication ring, a point to point communication system [6] .
LOCAL-AREA NETWORK CONFIGURATIONS
In this section are outline descriptions of the four network topologies to be studied. To illustrate the four types, and in order to provide a basis for comparison of their reliability, we have used model examples of each, with in each case a total of 19 stations on the network (see also Ranai [7] ).
I. Hierarchical topology
A hierarchical configuration, an example of which is outlined in Fig. l(a) , may be represented as a tree structure of stations. At the lowest level (the "leaves" of the tree) may be, for example, intelligent workstations, which are linked at the next level to a local filestore system. This may in turn be linked by a higher speed link to a more powerful centralized system. Hierarchical networks may clearly take a great variety of forms in particular cases; an example of one with a tri-level structure is the MISS network [8] .
Star topology
The star configuration consists of a single central processor to which all other network stations are attached by separate lines [see Fig. l(b) ]. This configuration is typical of the conventional multi-user computer system, of which there are a multitude of examples.
Bus topology
In a bus topology, all stations or nodes are connected by a common bus, whose capacity is shared amongst all stations. The model of a bus topology is shown in Fig. l(c) , where the various stations are plugged on to the main communication bus via a communicating interface. The transmission medium for the communicating channel is usually a single, passive coaxial cable. The communication channel of most bus networks is employed in a broadcast mode; that is, each user message is placed on the bus and presented to all the stations in the network. It is the responsibility of each station to determine whether the information is intended for itself or not. An example of the bus topology is the Ethernet system [5] . 
RELIABILITY GRAPH APPROACH
One general method for evaluating the reliability of any topology can be developed from the properties of its reliability graph. A reliability graph connects nodes or stations corresponding to computer centres in the local network with edges or branches corresponding to the communication links. It will be represented by G = (N, b) , where N are the stations in the local network and b are the communication links in the local network topology. This is shown as an example in Fig. 2 , which shows a reliability graph of 4 nodes and 6 communication links, that is G = (4, 6) .
From the reliability graph one can define a cut set of a graph as a set of branches which interrupts all connection between input and output, when removed from the graph, (see Boffrey [9] ). The minimal cut sets are a group of distinct cut set containing a minimum number of terms. All system failures can be represented by the removal of at least one minimal cut set from the graph. Then from the example in Fig. 2 , the number of minimal cut sets of the reliability graph is 4, and the removal of any of them will disconnect the flow of information between node 1 and node 4.
If a reliability graph has n minimal cut sets then the probability of system failure is therefore given by the probability that at least one minimal cut set fails. Thus the system reliability, R of the link between a given pair of stations, say S and T, is given by
i=l where P(Ci) represent the probability of failure of the ith minimal cut set of the reliability graph under consideration. For this analysis, only the possibility of link failure as a source of network failure will be considered. Then from Hansler et al. [10] , if a link consists of I communication lines in parallel, then the probability of link failure is given by p = p~-,(t-1), 0 ~< ~t ~< 1,
where P0 is the probability that a single line fails and • is related to the degree of correlation between the failures of parallel lines. The above expression was also used in the reliability analysis of the ARPA network. Finally let fl be the proability that the overall network system functions perfectly, assuming statistical independence. Then using the binomial model, the expression for fl is given by
where q is the probability of station failure.
With these three equations, the system reliability of the four topologies discussed in Section 2, will be investigated and compared with one another. The probabilities that are of interest are as follows:
(i) and (ii) the probability of the overall network system, P(fl), functioning perfectly assuming all station and link failures are statistically independent the reliability R, of the link between the central processor (S), and any one of the peripheral stations (T), (see Fig. 1 ), which is simply the product of the probability of success of each of the links between S and T, [see equation (1) above].
ANALYTICAL RESULTS (1)
For the purpose of illustration, the two probabilities have been calculated using the three equations presented above for each of the four topologies discussed, with p = 0.1 and q = 0.001 in each case. The results in the case of the hierarchical network are shown in detail in Table 1 .
It is clear that the probability of the network working perfectly will be the same for the The reliability R of the link between the stations S and Tis calculated using the worse-case choice of S and T for each network (see Fig. 1 ). This reliability is highest for the star topology, with R = 0.9 when l = 1, because in this case each station T has a single dedicated link to the central station S. The corresponding figures for R for the hierarchical, bus and loop topologies are 0.7290, 0.1501 and 0.1501, respectively. The relatively low link reliability for the bus and loop topologies is due to the characteristic of their design by which a single link failure brings about a global catastrophe in their functioning.
This relative weakness can again be improved substantially by doubling the number of lines between each station. In this case, with ~t = 0, R improves to 0.99 for the star configuration, 0.9702 for the hierarchical topology, and 0.8346 for the bus and loop. This improvement of the bus and loop topologies by doubling the communication links is discussed elsewhere by Zafiropulo [11] .
FAILURE-RATE MODEL APPROACH
The above analysis has shown how one can construct a combinatorial reliability model which expresses system reliability in terms of link reliability. This analysis of network failures assumes Table I . Results in the hierarchical network case P(C) Cutsets (C~) l = 1 l --2; ~t = 0 l = 2; ~t = 0.5 l = 2; a = 1 b 1.0000 x l0 -I 1.0000 x 10 -2 3.1622 × 10 -2 1.0000 × l0 -I f 1.0000 x I0 -I 1.0000 x 10 -2 3.1622 x l0 -2 1.0000 x 10 -l r 1.0000 x l0 -I 1.0000 x 10 -2 3.1622 x l0 -2 1.0000 x 10 -l Reliability, R of link S, T the communication link to be the most important feature contributing to such failures. This would be a valid assertion if low grade telephone type communication links over a switched network were in use. A local-area network will use a dedicated cable network offering high reliability and it is therefore more likely that, under such circumstances, a failure will be caused by a hardware fault in the network interface unit or communication processor.
To analyse this aspect of network reliability, wc will introduce failure models for the system hardware components. These hardware failure models are related to life-test results and failure-rate data via probability theory.
In practice the parameters that are normally associated with reliability evaluation are described by probability distributions. Not all components of a given type, construction, manufacture and operating condition will fail after the same operating time. These times-to-failure obey a probability distribution which may, or may not be known and which describes the probability that a given component fails within a certain specified time or survives beyond a certain specified time (see Billinton and Allan [12] ).
The exponential or strictly the negative exponential distribution is probably the most widely known and used distribution in reliability evaluation of systems. The most important factor for it to be applicable is that the hazard rate or failure rate ). (t) of a component should be constant; that is, a used device is equivalent to, and no more apt to fail, than a new device. ). (t) is defined as the ratio of the number of failures per unit time to the number of components exposed to failure.
There are basically two ways of obtaining part failure data: (1) from the failure times of various devices in a population placed on a life test and (2) from repair reports listing operating hours of replaced parts in equipment already in field use.
Following from the exponential distribution, the probability of a component surviving for a time t, if the failure rate ).(t) is constant is given by
Then the probability of surviving for an n-component series system, where all n components must operate for system success, is given by fi R,(t) = .. exp( --).it) = exp iffil where 2~, ).2,..-, )., are the failure rates of the n components in series, respectively.
The nature and consequences of any hardware failure will depend on the particular topology under investigation. In the case of a star topology, the failure of a single communication interface would result in the loss of traffic to and from the corresponding station, whereas a failure of global hardware at the central station, that is the communication processor, would result in a complete network shutdown. Hence, the overall reliability of the star type network depends very much on how reliable the central or master processor is. For the hierarchical type network the reliability of the system depends on the reliability of the intermediate processors between the root and the base of the network.
We will here concentrate on the loop type network, taking the Cambridge ring (see Fig. 3 ) as an example, and the bus type network such as the Ethernet (see Fig. 4 ). In both of these networks, the hardware access mechanism of network stations is designed such that station failure does not interfere with overall network operation.
I. The Cambridge digital communication ring
The Cambridge ring consists of a number of stations or nodes. Each node consists of a repeater and a station unit, which are identical for all nodes, and an access box which provides the interface between the device and the station unit. These four components are connected in series as shown in Fig. 3 . A unique node called the monitor station is also present in the Cambridge ring (see Needham [13] and Wilkes [6] for details). Let )1, ).2, 23 and ).4 represent the failure rates of the repeater, station unit, access unit and the device respectively, at each normal node, and 2~ and 2~ represent the failure rates of the repeater and the monitor station respectively at the monitor node. Then using equation (5), the reliability of each normal node is given by
R,(t)=exp(-i~ 2it)
and the reliability of the monitor node is given by 2 / Rm(t)-exp (--i__~ I Ait).
Then using equations (6) and (7), and assuming the links are 100% reliable, the overall reliability of the Cambridge ring with G = (19, 19) is given by
Ethernet system
Using the same approach the reliability of a bus type topology, taking Ethernet as an example, can also be calculated. The Ethernet under consideration is as described in the Ethernet specification given by Metcalfe [5] (see Fig. 4 ). Individual computers or stations are connected to the coaxial cable with the use of a CATV-style tap; a small transceiver is connected at the tap, with the cable running down to the interface which might be located in the station. Terminators are required at the end of each coaxial cable to prevent reflection of signals (see also Shoch [14] ).
Let F~, ~'2, Y3 and ~4 represent the failure rates of the tap, transceiver, interface/controller unit and the station device respectively, and 75 and 76 represent the failure rates of the two terminators. Then using equation (5) Using equations (4) and (9), the overall reliability of the Ethernet with G = (19, 18), including the two terminators but assuming no link failure is given by 
Re(t) = I ~-I [R"(t)]J} exp(-ySt) exp(-~
=
Redundant cabling
The above reliability analysis of the Cambridge ring and the Ethernct is based on the assumption that all the cable connections are 100% reliable. To complete an analysis of the Cambridge ring, we will consider the possibility of link failure as well as of station failure, and assume there now exists a redundant cabling between each node on the ring as shown in Fig. 5 . With the existence of the redundant cables, there now must exist some sort of sensing or changeover device, which itself cannot be guaranteed to be 100% reliable.
Suppose P~ is the probability of successful operation of the sensing or changeover device. Then considering the reliability of each link segment in turn, as shown in Fig. 5 , the overall reliability of the Cambridge ring including the rcliabilities of the cabling connection can be calculated. The arrangement of Fig. 5 can be regarded as an equivalent single unit which is allowed to fail once. After the first failure, that is failure of link A, the standby link B takes over, and therefore the whole ring does not fail. If there is a second failure, that is failure of link B, the whole ring system fails. The logic of this link segment operation implies that the Poisson distribution can be used to evaluate the link segment reliability, since the Poisson distribution gives the probability of any number of link failures provided the links are operating in their useful life period. This probability is given by (11) where PL(t) denotes the probability that L links fail in time t, and fl is the failure rate of the link. 
PL(t) = (fit) L exp(-flt)/fact(L ),
For the Cambridge ring under investigation with 19 nodes (18 stations and 1 monitor station), the reliability of the 18 stations and their corresponding link segments may be obtained using equations (6) and (12) by the formula For the monitor station and its link segment, the reliability is given by
RML(t)=exp(--~=, ~.~t)exp(--,t)(1 + P~,t). (14)
Then the overall reliability of the Cambridge ring with G = (19, 19), with redundant cabling which is not 100% reliable is given by (15) where RsL(t) and RML(t) are given by equations (13) and (14) above, respectively.
R'~(t) = RsL(t)" RuL(t),

ANALYTICAL RESULTS (2)
The results of some reliability calculations for the Cambridge ring and the Ethernet system, using the hardware failure models described above, are presented in the various graphs from Figure 6 illustrates the overall reliability of the Cambridge ring with G = (19, 19) , assuming 100% link reliability, for three values of 0. With 0 = 0.002 failures/y, the reliability Re(t) is 0.9286 for t = 0.5 y, and remains as high as 0.4771 over a 5 y period. For higher values of the failure rate 0, there is an exponential decline in reliability as the period over which it is calculated increases. The results for Ethernet are very similar, as may be seen from the comparison illustrated in Fig.  7 , in which the Cambridge ring appears about 4% more reliable over a 2 y period. This result is only true based on the assumption made above that 0 = O, since real values for the hardware component failure rates were not available for both systems. However, in reality the Cambridge ring is certainly not more reliable than the Ethernet system, because Ethernet is passive and is very resilient to failures as compared to the Cambridge ring. Added to this is the fact that the performance and reliability of the monitor station in the Cambridge ring is critical, and so are the repeaters which are embedded in the link. Figure 8 shows the results of an analysis of the Cambridge ring in four different cases differing only in the assumptions made about the cabling and link reliability. From this comparison it is apparent that the reliability of the case in which redundant cabling is employed is close to that in which the links are assumed to be 100% reliable, provided that the changeover device has a satisfactory reliability.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have examined some aspects of the reliability of four typical network topologies: the hierarchical, star, bus and loop or ring types. It has been shown how an approach derived from graph theory may be used to analyse the link reliability of these and other network topologies. The method was illustrated using worked examples based on particular model instances of the four topologies under consideration.
For an analysis of station reliability, a failure-rate model approach was used to study networks of the bus and ring type, taking the Ethernet and Cambridge ring networks in particular. Finally, expressions were derived for the overall reliability of a Cambridge ring incorporating both link and station failure in the analysis. The results from the worked examples using this analysis show that the vulnerability to link failure which is inherent in networks of loop topology may be almost compensated for by doubling the number of communication links, provided that changeover to the "fail-safe" link is performed with a satisfactory reliability.
